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Cranor's Reply
Merz and Frey's review of Regulating Toxic Substances, 1 while
summarizing some of my main points correctly, suggests that they may
have a different view of the legal/regulatory environment than was
articulated there. This may lead to some differences between us. While
some regulatory safety statutes require manufacturers to have
government approval before their products are permitted into
commerce, this may be less significant than seems presupposed in their
review. 2 Many, perhaps most, substances have come into commerce or
the environment as products, byproducts, contaminants or pollutants
without extensive required testing for effects on human health "or the
environment. 3 Legislation of the 1970's sought to address this, but it is
not clear how successful it has been. 4 Since the Toxic Substance Control
Act was enacted in 1976, it is not clear how carefully substances
permitted into the environment have been screened under its premarket
approval procedure. 5 Moreover, under most regulatory statutes,
substances cannot be withdrawn from commerce, or exposures to
pollutants or contaminants regulated, without the government's bearing
a burden of proof to establish harm at current exposure levels. 6 Also,
tort law remedies are not available to plaintiffs who fail to carry both a
burden of production to the satisfaction of a judge and a burden of
1
2

Hereafter RTS.
See Merz & Frey review supra,at 77-8 (hereafter M&F).
Sections of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act require premarket approval of pesticides and the

Toxic Substances Control Act requires premanufacture notifications for substances
(including minimal testing) to be filed with the EPA, and then the EPA ordinarily has

90 days to identify substances that need further testing. Under these three laws,
however, premarket review applies only to "new" chemicals. Office of Technology
Assessment, Identifying and Regulating Carcinogens, 199 (1987) (hereafter OTA).
3 For pesticides, in 1987 there were about 600 that had been in the market prior to
1970 that had not been adequately tested at all. Even many registered since 1970 lack

full toxicity testing; OTA, supra note 2, at 118-126.
4
5
6

Id, at 3-20, esp. 18.
Id., at 14 and 126-134.
Id, at 199-200.
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persuasion to the satisfaction of a jury, each of which presents barriers to
tort deterrence of exposures to harmful substances.
In this legal setting, environmental scientists must provide eidence
of harm before a substance can be regulated more stringently or before
a tort suit is successful. Scientific standards of evidence tend to be
much more demanding than legal burdens of proof.7 In recent years,
widespread discussion has urged that scientific information should be
required to document even more thoroughly that substances are
harmful before regulatory or tort action is permitted. Given the current
legal/tort environment and the much more stringent burdens of proof
in science, such demands greatly increase the difficulty of regulating
substances or of bringing successful tort suits. The coincidence of
scientific and legal burdens of proof may have gone unnoticed, but
together, these can have profound consequences for protecting human
health. Merz and Frey may not fully appreciate this.
The science of risk assessment is both different from core areas of
science and substantially permeated by uncertainties that carry
unnoticed normative and other consequences. 8 For example, if data
and theories that would answer the question of whether X is a human
carcinogen have a number of uncertainties, but one is not permitted to
judge that it is a human carcinogen until all uncertainties have been
removed, as typical scientific practice would have it, then the scientific
position per force favors one side of the debate. Demands for more and
better data, better mechanistic understanding and removing all or most
uncertainties exacerbate this problem. Moreover, while stringent
evidentiary demands are appropriate for the progress of science because
they prevent mistakenly adding to the stock of scientific information,
they are inconsistent with good environmental and public health policy
namely preventing false negatives and providing early warning of
potential harms. (If the burdens of proof in the tort and regulatory law
were reversed so that the safety of substances had to be established
before human exposure was permitted, would parties currently arguing
7
8

RTS, at 55, 77 and 156.
Id, at 13-38.

Book Reviews 83

for more stringent science change their views?) Further, for statisticallybased scientific information, the more scientists try to reduce false
positives mathematically, the higher false negative rates are, other things
being equal. 9
There is an interaction between the substantive scientific standards
of evidence and substantive legal standards of evidence. With the
Daubert court, I argued that the Frye test for the admissibility of
scientific evidence should be abandoned in the tort law. 10 I argued, also
similar to that Court, that only some scintilla of probative value should
be sufficient to introduce evidence (even if it is insufficient to carry the
burden of persuasion). 1 ' Should the threshold burden of production
incorporate the demanding scientific standards of evidence and make
this threshold similar to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of
proof in criminal laws? 1 2 I think not, but this will result if we
deliberately or inadvertently incorporate scientific burdens of proof into
legally required burdens. When low false positive rates are required,
scientific skepticism and the mathematics of statistical studies work for
defendants. Would Merz and Frey endorse this result? The tort law
typically does (and should) strike a somewhat different balance
between false positives and false negatives than the balance in research
science, as well as a different balance than some courts and
commentators are recommending. Further, when we assess risk for
regulatory purposes, we should realize that the rate of assessment is
important. If substances in commerce are harmful, and agencies are
slow in assessing them, the harm continues. Thus, slowness is itself
harmful. Yet, many recent recommendations would slow regulatory
13
risk assessments beyond their present snail's pace.
9
10

Id., at 31-40.
Id, at 60-71.

11

Id, at77.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993):
"[I]n the event that the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented
supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the
position more likely than not is true the court remains free to direct a judgment...."
12

RTS, at 76-78.
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Finally, because of the uncertainties and the complexity of risk
assessment, mistakes will result from our environmental science and
regulatory activities. Mistakes will result because of evidentiary
problems or because we have evaluated toxic substances too slowly or, if we adopt expedited procedures, too quickly "14 I agree with Merz
and Frey that it is difficult to find evidence of these kinds of mistakes
and their rate. 1 5 Epidemiological and other scientific studies can be
negative even when substances are harmful. 1 6 Thus, we are frequently
surprised by the toxicity of products in our midst; this suggests that
17
false negatives are a problem.
The issue is not: Will mistakes be made, but which ones? How shall
we err? How do we design assessment procedures and legal institutions
to prevent which mistakes? As I assess some approaches, the
coincidence of legal and scientific burdens of proof strongly tends to
predispose legal decisions to more false negatives than seems desirable.
Of course, there are now false positives as well. Yet, one political
difference between false positives and negatives is that the former tend
to have a built in constituency (firms whose products may cause harm),
but false negatives do not (because isolated individuals who suffer harm
are unlikely to discover their common cause). For both political and
scientific reasons, false negatives are not easily identified. Thus, "I...
suggested... modifications in complex existing or recommended
procedures in institutions to try to achieve a more appropriate balance
' 18
of these kinds of mistakes.
13 Id, at 115-126.
14 Merz and Frey appear to suggest a sharp distinction between the presumed policy
or moral - neutrality of risk assessment and risk management. Yet if the
arguments of RTS are correct, this separation is not easy; RTS, at 23-28.
15 Whether the costs of underregulation are greater than the costs of overregulation
is difficult to answer; M&F, at 76. Partly this is a monetary question; partly it is a
non-monetary social question - how we view costs of more expensive products (or
their loss) versus how we view any social or human costs of increased exposures to
toxic substances. Thus, it will be difficult to obtain adequate empirical data on this
issue.
16 RTS, at 31-39 & 136.
17 E. W. Lawless, Technology and Social Shock (1977).
18 RTS , at 134. Merz and Frey's comment about preventing "paralysis... [so that
-
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I argued that regulatory agencies should adopt faster risk
assessment procedures and rely on consistent default positions and
policy judgments to address uncertainties in the science.1" (Risk
assessments relying on default procedures need not be inconsistent as
Merz and Frey suggest - agencies currently follow such procedures,
often as a matter of administrative procedure.) Also, appellate courts
should recognize the need for agencies to rely on such approximations
and expedited scientific methods. 2 0 Such modifications in practices
and procedures could give somewhat greater weight to avoiding false
negatives than at present without a major overhaul of either regulation
or tort law.
Finally, it is important to recognize the complex relationship
between the tort and the regulatory law. I agree with Merz and Frey
that regulatory agencies in theory are better situated to judge complex
risk tradeoffs and that tort law is not and should not be seen as a
substitute for many reasons. However, agencies are subject to powerful
political pressures that can undermine a fair consideration of issues.
Given these and other problems, tort law, despite its "blurred signals to
firms," should backup regulatory law, and it should not be so
hamstrung by implicit scientific burdens of proof, restrictive
admissibility rules or unwise preemption rules as to preclude this vital
21
function.
we can] take action such as the marketing of a new drug or chemical before all risks
are known or well-characterized" is puzzling; M&F, at 79. It suggests that I have
urged more stringent premarket regulations (which I have not). Identifying and
controlling potentially'harmful substances already in commerce or the environment
seem the more immediate issues.
19 RTS, at 137. Merz and Frey note that uncertainties can only be "reduced" by
data and information. I tried to use the phrase "addressing uncertainties," but
occasionally used "reduced;" RTS, at 136. Nonetheless, there are different kinds of
uncertainties. Some can be addressed in the short run by choices - choosing different
models consistent with complex regulatory aims - while others are addressed by
measuring more carefully, by better data, etc.
20 RTS, at 147-151.
21 Merz and Frey call attention to recent cases which permit regulatory law and
proceedings to preempt state tort actions. For reasons indicated here and in the book,
this does not seem tobe a desirable trend. Id, at 63-66.
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As noted by Merz and Frey, a moral view underlies these
recommendations. Many in the regulatory arena implicitly adopt a
utilitarian approach to evaluating institutions and public policy. But this
paradigm tends to underprotect individual welfare because its main
focus is overall social efficiency (cost-benefit analysis is a bastardized
version of it). Thus, severe harms to a few. can be outweighed (in
principle) by minor benefits to many, and the distribution of benefits
22
and burdens of a social policy are not necessarily a part of the theory.
Utilitarian theories 'must be augmented or rejected because of these
concerns. Theories of justice would give greater, but not necessarily
decisive, weight to protecting individuals from the harms of toxic
substances. However, I stopped short of suggesting a full rights-based
alternative, and I stopped substantially short of claiming that "the
imposition of risk on any member of society is immoral," 2 3 a view to
which I do not subscribe.
Thus, I argue for a change in paradigms regarding the amount of
scientific information to be legally required both to regulate and to
recover in tort - as well as for a change in how we think about such
issues morally. Together, such paradigm changes will shift
environmental health protections to fewer false negatives, albeit with the
possibility of more false positives. Such institutional changes would
improve current procedures and correct present trends.
Carl F. Cranort

22 Id, at 163-168.
23 M&F, at 79.
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